THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY
OVER
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
INVOLVEMENT
IN
TRANSPORTATION
By Dennis Polhill
Research assistance by
Dominque Tarpey and Steve McWhirter
Presented at
American Legislative Exchange Council
Seattle, Washington
July 2004
At least 9 Presidents of the United States
issued public statements to Congress
indicating that the U.S. Constitution
required amending before
the Federal government could
become involved in Transportation policy.
In 2004 the question is rarely raised.
INTRODUCTION
The controversy over whether the Federal government is permitted by the Constitution to be involved in transportation improvements began soon after adoption of the Constitution.
At least nine United States Presidents very strongly believed that the enumerated powers in Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution excluded Federal involvement in transportation improvements. Evidence of their convictions is expressed in unmistakable terms in their veto messages.
CUMBERLAND ROAD – An ambiguity that emerged from early American history is the Cumberland Road. The first Federal funded highway connected the head of navigation on the Potomac River (Cumberland, Maryland) to the head of navigation on the Ohio River (Wheeling, West Virginia). Construction was authorized by Congress on March 29, 1806. Contracts were issued in 1811, but the War of 1812 interfered and construction did not begin until 1815 and was finished in 1818. America’s eagerness to solidify its claims on western lands was in conflict with Constitutional limitations on Federal authority.
In 1803 Congress passed the 5 percent law. Five percent of the revenue generated from the sale of Federally owned public lands was deposited into a fund. Funds generated from 60% of the five percent (three percent) were granted to the States upon admission to the Union for roads, canals, levees, river improvements and schools. Funds generated from the remainder, two percent, were dedicated for constructing roads “to and through” the West. Bitter debate ensued when the two percent funds were allocated in 1806 to build the Cumberland Road. Jefferson chose expediency by not vetoing the bill, but issued his important message[1] to Congress later in 1806 suggesting that the Constitution should be amended to allow Federal involvement in “internal improvements.”
The Cumberland Road became so heavily used that it fell into disrepair. When Congress sought to again intervene by establishing tolls for maintenance in 1822, Monroe issued his only veto, arguing that Federal collection of tolls implied a power of jurisdiction, that was not granted to the Federal government by the Constitution. By 1835 the Cumberland Road was known as the National Road and extended into Illinois. The dilemma was resolved when control was devolved to the respective States that operated it as a toll facility until toll roads were bankrupted by railroad competition.
PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS REGARDING ENUMERATED POWERS
JEFFERSON – In his December 2, 1806 message to Congress, President Thomas Jefferson considered the problem of a revenue surplus. Reduction of the import duty on salt would give “advantage to foreign over domestic manufactures.” Jefferson recommended “continuance and application to the great purposes of the public education, roads, rivers, canals, and such other objects of public improvement as it may be thought proper to add to the constitutional enumeration of federal powers.” That is, Jefferson favored acceleration of Federal sponsorship, but was of the view that the U.S. Constitution must be amended to allow it.
Jefferson commented again on this topic in a February 14, 1824 thank you letter to Robert J. Garnett. Garrett had given a copy of a book by Colonel Taylor, “New Views of the Constitution.” The letter mentioned “the three great questions of amendment:” presidential term limits, popular election of the president, and giving to Congress the power over internal improvement on the condition that each State’s federal proportion of the moneys so expended, shall be employed in the State.
MADISON – James Madison, author of the U.S. Constitution, succeeded Jefferson as President in 1808. In Madison’s last official act as President he issued a veto on March 3, 1817. The bill, passed in February 1817, provided for setting aside the Bank bonus of $1,500,000 as a permanent fund for internal improvements. To circumvent the constitutional prohibition, the bill language cleverly mixed rhetoric including “internal commerce,” “general welfare,” and “common defense.” Madison replied specifically to each of these claims of authority.
Madison favored the policy but vetoed the bill as unconstitutional, “I am constrained, by the insuperable difficulty I feel in reconciling the bill with the Constitution of the United States.”[2]
He refers Congress to the Constitution, “The legislative powers vested in Congress are specified and enumerated in the 8th section of the first article.” He adds, “The power to regulate commerce among the several States, cannot include a power to construct roads … without a latitude of construction departing from the ordinary import of the terms.”
“To refer to the power in question as ‘common defense and general welfare,’ would be contrary to the established and consistent rules of interpretation … such a view of the Constitution would have the effect of giving to Congress a general power of legislation … It would have the effect of subjecting both the Constitution and laws of the several States, in all cases not specifically exempted, to be superseded by laws of Congress.” Finally, Madison points out “the assent of the States … cannot confer the power.” In other words the states must agree by amending the Constitution, but may not agree to ignore its structurally imposed limitations on Congressional powers. In the final paragraph Madison asserts, “that the permanent success of the Constitution depends on a definite partition of powers between the General and the State government, and that no adequate land-marks would be left by the constructive extension of the powers of Congress, as proposed in the bill.”
Madison’s veto message closed with sympathy for the policy objective, “I am not unaware of the great importance of roads … and hope that (the bill’s) beneficial objects may be attained …”
MONROE – James Monroe was elected in 1816 to succeed Madison. His only veto was issued on May 4, 1822. Monroe, like Madison and Jefferson, approved of the policy, but vetoed the Cumberland Road Bill as unconstitutional, “Congress does not possess the power under the Constitution to pass such a law.”[3] Monroe reiterated Madison’s points, “This power can be granted only by an amendment to the Constitution.” In addition to the indirect claims of authority refuted in Madison’s veto (commerce, general welfare and common defense), the Cumberland Road Bill claimed Congressional authority under post roads, the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested by the Constitution in the government, and the power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property of the United States. Monroe, “it cannot be derived from either of those powers, nor from all of them united, and as a consequence it does not exist.” He closes by suggesting that “Congress (exercise) the propriety of recommending to the states an amendment to the Constitution.” Monroe’s veto message is brief, less than two pages in the Congressional Record, but he elaborates exhaustively in his May 4, 1822 “Views of the President of the United States on the Subject of Internal Improvements.” This document is nearly 30,000 words, is not part of the Congressional Record.[4]
JACKSON -Congress became more aggressive. Andrew Jackson (President 1828-1836) vetoed four transportation bills as unconstitutional. Like his predecessors he favored federal participation in internal improvements, but understood the Constitution as not allowing, and therefore prohibiting, it. Jackson offered support to advancing the necessary Constitutional amendment by suggesting public agreement made the amendment possible, “If it be the wish of the people that the construction of roads and canals should be conducted by the Federal Government, it is not only highly expedient, but indispensably necessary, that a previous amendment of the Constitution, delegating the necessary power, and defining and restricting its exercise with reference to the sovereignty of the States, should be made.” In other words, public consent made an amendment achievable and preservation of both the Constitution and State sovereignty requires it. Congress elected to not advance the suggested Constitutional Amendment.
The Maysville, Washington, Paris, and Lexington Turnpike Road Company was vetoed as “unconstitutional”[5] on May 27, 1830. This is one of the longer veto messages consuming 10 pages (over 6,000 words) in the House Journal. Jackson reviewed the history of his predecessors on the question and summarized the arguments on both sides of the issue. In the end he agreed with his predecessor-Presidents, “When an honest observance of Constitutional compacts cannot be obtained from communities like ours, it need not be anticipated elsewhere; and the cause in which there has been so much martyrdom, and from which so much was expected by the friends of liberty, may be abandoned, and the degrading truth, that man is unfit for self government, admitted. And this will be the case, if expediency be made a rule of construction in interpreting the Constitution … No good motive can be assigned for the exercise of power by the constituted authorities, while those for whose benefit it is to be exercised have not conferred it.”
Jackson’s Maysville veto message reiterates language from the Monroe veto message supplement, which evolved into another criterion, “purely local character,” that appears in subsequent vetoes in various forms. This is discussed in a subsequent section.
The Washington Turnpike Road Company was vetoed as “unconstitutional”[6] on May 31, 1830.
Jackson’s next “unconstitutional” veto was of “An Act to authorize subscription for stock in the Louisville and Portland Canal Company” passed near adjournment and he provided the veto message to Congress on December 7, 1830. Again he refers Congress to the Maysville veto for edification. “The practice of thus mingling the concerns of the government with those of the States or of individuals, is inconsistent with the object of its institution. The successful operation of the federal system can only be preserved by confining it to the few and simple, but yet important objects for which it was designed. A different practice, if allowed to progress, would ultimately change the character of this Government, by consolidating into one the General and State Governments, which were intended to be kept forever distinct.”[7]
Jackson’s last transportation veto as “unconstitutional” came on December 2, 1834 of “An Act to improve the navigation of the Wabash River.” “I cannot refrain from expressing my increasing conviction of its extreme importance, as well in regard to its bearing upon the maintenance of the Constitution … the dangers of unconstitutional acts which, instead of menacing the vengeance of offended authority, proffer local advantages, and bring in their train the patronage …in my opinion, the Constitution did not confer upon (Congress) the power to authorize the construction of ordinary roads and canals … I could not consider myself as discharging my duty to my constituents in giving the Executive sanction to any bill containing such an appropriation.”[8]
TYLER – John Tyler vetoed as “unconstitutional” “An Act making appropriations for the improvement of certain harbors and rivers,” on June 11, 1844. “At the adoption of the Constitution, each State was possessed of independent sovereignty … (which) expressly reserve(d) to the States all powers not delegated … (Congressional) power, in order to be legitimate must be clearly and plainly incidental to some granted power, and necessary to its exercise. To refer it to the head of convenience or usefulness would be to throw open the door to a boundless and unlimited discretion and to invest Congress with an unrestrained authority.”[9]
Tyler also pocket-vetoed “An Act making appropriations for the improvement of the navigation of certain rivers” on January 28, 1845, but issued no veto message, suggesting that he had said all that he wished to say on the issue in his June 11, 1844 veto message.
POLK – On August 3, 1946 James Polk delivered a veto message to Congress for “An Act making appropriations for the improvement of certain harbors and rivers.” The bill appropriated $1,378,450 to more than 40 objects of improvement. Because of the “local character” of these projects, Polk said, “it is difficult to conceive … what practical constitutional restraint can hereafter be imposed … The Constitution has not, in my judgment, conferred upon the federal government the power to construct works of internal improvements … The approved course of the government, and the deliberately expressed judgment of the people, have denied the existence of such a power under the Constitution. Several of my predecessors have denied its existence in the most solemn forms … The general proposition that the federal government does not possess this power is well settled.”[10] Polk also advances a test for constitutionality originally laid down by Madison, “Whenever a question arises concerning a particular power, the first question is whether the power be expressed in the Constitution. If it be, the question is decided. If it be not expressed, the next inquiry must be, whether it is properly an incident to an expressed power, and necessary to its execution. If it be, it may be exercised by Congress. If it be not, Congress cannot exercise it.”
Polk issued a second veto of a transportation bill on December 15, 1847 of “An Act to provide for continuing certain works in the Territory of Wisconsin, and for other purposes.” Polk’s first objection was the bill’s misleading title. It passed on the last day of a session and appropriated $6,000 for “continuing” work, while $500,000 was appropriated for numerous new projects. The veto message opens by referring Congress to his prior veto message of August 3, 1946 and referenced to comments found in the veto messages of Madison, Monroe, and Jackson. Polk also quotes Jefferson’s 1806 message to Congress recommending “an amendment to the Constitution.” Restating the obvious Polk writes, “No express grant of this power is found in the Constitution.”[11]
PIERCE – Franklin Pierce issued seven transportation vetoes, more than any other President. “An Act making appropriations for the repair, preservation, and completion of certain public works theretofore commenced under the authority of law” was vetoed as “unconstitutional” on August 4, 1854. This bill is “not, in my judgment, warranted by any safe or true construction of the Constitution.”[12]
His first veto message was brief because the bill reached him in the “expiring hours” of a session, but Pierce elaborates at length in his December 30, 1854 (read on January 2, 1855) message to Congress. He recites the 10th Amendment to the Constitution as further evidence to clarify the intended specificity of the enumerated powers listed in Article 1, Section 8. He reasoned, “If the framers of the Constitution, wise and thoughtful men as they were, intended to confer on Congress the power over a subject so wide as the whole field of internal improvements, it is remarkable that they did not use language clearly to express it.” In response to the assertion that language in the Constitution’s Preamble inferred a power vested Congress with authority over internal improvements, he wrote, “To assume that anything more can be designed by the language of the Preamble would be to convert all the body of the Constitution.”
On March 3, 1855, Pierce vetoed “An Act making appropriations for transportation of the United States mail by ocean steamer and otherwise, during fiscal years ending the 30th of June 1855 and the 30th of June 1856.” In addition to citing that the appropriation was both a bad spending priority and a poor policy, Pierce stated that the bill was “of doubtful compatibility with the Constitution.”[13]
Congress persisted by passing “An Act to remove obstructions to navigation in the mouth of the Mississippi River at the Southwest pass and Pass a l’Outre.” It was vetoed on May 19, 1856, with “my views were exhibited in full on the subject … the Constitution does not confer on the general government any express powers to make such appropriations.”[14]
“An Act making an appropriation for deepening the channel over the St. Clair flats, in the State of Michigan” was vetoed on May 19, 1856 as violating the Constitutional “restriction on the power of Congress.”[15]
“An Act making an appropriation for deepening the channel over the flats of the St. Mary’s River, in the State of Michigan” was vetoed on May 22, 1856, as “not a necessary means for execution of any of the expressly granted powers of the federal government.”[16]
“An Act for continuing the improvement of the Des Moines rapids, in the Mississippi River” was vetoed on August 11, 1856. For elaboration Congress was referred to his prior veto messages.[17]
“An Act for the improvement of the navigation of the Patapsco River, and to render the port of Baltimore accessible to the war steamers of the United States” was vetoed on August 14, 1856. Pierce again referred Congress to his prior veto messages.[18]
BUCHANAN – President James Buchanan vetoed “An Act making an appropriation for deepening the channel over the St. Clair flats, in the State of Michigan” on February 1, 1860, as “a violation of the spirit of the Constitution.” Buchanan declined to provide a protracted reply, “The question of the Constitutional power of Congress to construct internal improvements within the States has been so frequently and so elaborately discussed that it would seem useless on this occasion to repeat or to refute at length arguments which have been so often advanced.” Suffice it to say, he agreed with his predecessors. He specifically refers Congress to the Polk veto of December 15, 1847 and offers, “The corrupting and seducing money influence exerted by the general government in carrying into effect a system of internal improvements might be perverted to increase and consolidate its own power to the detriment of the rights of the States.”[19]
ARTHUR – Chester A. Arthur was the last President to unambiguously express his Constitutional views in a veto message. On August 1, 1882 he vetoed, “An Act making appropriations for the construction, repair, and preservation of certain works on rivers and harbors, and for other purposes.” “I regard such appropriations of the public money as beyond the powers given by the Constitution to Congress and the President. I feel the more bound to withhold my signature from the bill because of the peculiar evils which manifestly result from this infraction of the Constitution.”[20]
PRESIDENTIAL VETO SUMMARY – This research of transportation vetoes finds that eight president vetoed 19 transportation bills as unconstitutional violations of enumerated powers. Jefferson provided the same language in his December 2, 1806 message leaving no doubt of his views on this question (Jefferson issued no vetoes during his presidency). Links to Senate and House Journals where the exact and complete language of the respective messages may be reviewed are provided in Appendix A.
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE BRANCHES
The most significant power of a President is the power to veto legislation. Thus, a veto represents the most solemn and sacred act exercised by a President. A veto may be advanced for any reason or no reason at all. Most are due to disagreement over scope, methods, nature or priorities of legislation; or philosophical differences.
All Presidents wisely strive to sustain a positive and constructive working relationship with the legislative branch. Clearly, all of the nine veto-Presidents (Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson, Tyler, Polk, Pierce, Buchanan, and Arthur) had the option to not use confrontational language by issuing their vetoes on other-than-constitutional grounds. But they did not, inferring both a powerful strength of conviction and an enormous sense of obligation to express their Constitutional understandings. That many also exercised these vetoes contrary to their own preference for policy, strengthens the message in their words.
Each of the above vetoes in effect accused members of Congress of ignoring their oaths of office to uphold the Constitution, of failing to comprehend the Constitution’s meaning and intent, or of being unwilling to abide by clearly enumerated Constitutional limitations. Such accusations are neither trivial nor conducive to a positive working relationship. Their principled stances provided no rewards.
GENERAL OR LOCAL BENEFIT – The views of the nine veto-Presidents above as represented by unmistakable language directed at Congress are unequivocal. The specific views of other Presidents are less clearly decipherable from their veto message language.
The Jackson Maysville veto advanced Monroe language that evolved into criterion that appears in several subsequent vetoes in some form, “general welfare” of “purely local character” and eventually became the slippery slope that yielded current Federal involvement. Did the vetoes of the subsequent Presidents seek to be more subtle and less offensive with their rhetoric toward Congress? Did these words mean to say with less insult to the integrity of Congress, “unconstitutional under enumerated powers?”
This research does not attempt to comprehensively inventory all vetoes with this ambiguous language. The cited veto messages sometimes included words like, “for the benefit of particular localities”, “of local interest”, or “lacking a general benefit.” A partial list of such vetoes follows:
- Benjamin Harrison, April 29, 1890 “a matter of local interest”
- Benjamin Harrison, June 4 1890 “the public needs do not suggest or justify such an expenditure”
- Grover Cleveland, May 23, 1888 “(not) necessary for the transaction of public business”
- Grover Cleveland, May 29, 1896 “for the benefit of limited localities”
- Grover Cleveland, July 7, 1896 “I (am not) satisfied that the legislation proposed is demanded by any exigency of the public welfare”
- Theodore Roosevelt, March 3, 1903, “for local improvement”
- Woodrow Wilson, July 11, 1918 “not in the public interest”
- Herbert Hoover, July 11, 1932 “Fraught as it is with possibilities of misfeasance and special privileges”
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 11, 1940 “the public interests are not such”
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 2, 1941 “benefits of such expenditures are dependent upon local enforcement”
A Calvin Coolidge veto on May 18, 1928 comes close but does not quite state “local interest” as his reason, “Having in mind the increasing ability of the States to finance road construction due to the general adoption of the gasoline tax and the increase in revenue from this source which would accrue to States from roads.” The State gasoline tax was a comparatively new innovation. A Federal gasoline tax was, as yet, nonexistent. Coolidge was, in effect, arguing against a Federal program of taxation and redistribution, the net effect of which would have advanced Federal involvement in State transportation decisions.
SEPARATION OF POWERS – As adherence to the Constitution slipped further from public perception, Congress acted to enlarge its power by including in legislation that Department Secretaries report directly to Congressional Committees. Presidents objected to this infringement in another series of vetoes. These are on Constitutional grounds, but because the limitations of Article 1, Section 8 seem to have been largely forgotten, the basis is encroachment on Executive Powers by the Legislative Branch. These illustrate Congress’ insatiable thirst for more power.
- Dwight D. Eisenhower, July 16, 1956 “violate the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers”
- Lyndon B. Johnson, June 4, 1965 “undesirable and improper encroachment by the Congress and its committees into the area of executive responsibilities”
- Lyndon B. Johnson, August 21, 1965 “repugnant to the Constitution (by) encroachment (on) the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches”
- Richard Nixon, April 5, 1973 “conflicts with the allocation of executive power to the President”
- Jimmy Carter, July 10, 1978 “directs Secretaries to report to congressional committees”
OPENING THE FLOODGATES
INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM – On June 29, 1956 President Eisenhower signed into law the “National System of Interstate and Defense Highways.” Title II, the Highway Revenue Act, was its financial component that raised the Federal gasoline tax from 1 cent (implemented in 1932) to 2 cents (raised to 3 cents in 1958 and to 4 cents in 1959) per gallon and was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1972. The 40,000 miles of new highways would be State owned and operated. The Federal role was fiscal, to collect and redistribute revenues to expedite construction by States. Conformity of construction among the States was an important goal of the legislation. The Clay Committee estimated the total cost at $27 billion. The bill authorized $25 billion. By 1958 the system had increased to 41,000 miles at a total estimated cost of $41 billion. In 1966 the Bureau of Public Roads became the U.S. Department of Transportation. The Interstate System was completed in 1982. In 1976 the Federal gasoline tax was extended and in 1990 increased from 9 cents to 14 cents. Currently the Federal gasoline tax, at 18.4 cents, generates about $40 billion per year.
GROWTH OF PORK – In “Breach of Trust” former U.S. Representative Thomas Coburn of Oklahoma defines pork as “one member of Congress determines where the money is to be spent.” Congress uses the friendlier label: “earmark.” By this definition Federal Transportation Legislation contained only ten pork projects in 1982 at a cost of $386 million. The 1987 bill contained 150 pork projects for $1,300 million, motivating a Reagan veto. By 1991 the number of projects had grown to 539, at $6,200 million and the 1998 bill contained “a record shattering 1,467 pork projects for $9,500 million.” “Shuster consistently argued that setting aside 5 percent … was a very reasonable thing to do.” The debate had moved quite considerably afar from the points so eloquently articulated by Madison, and others.
Coburn elaborates on how these projects are generated by vote-buying. Maverick Congresspersons who say, “My vote is not for sale” are punished. The going rate of $15 million for a vote for the 1998 bill was corroborated by several Congresspersons. House Transportation Chairman, Shuster, lividly denied the accusations as “McCarthyism.” But Budget Committee Chairman, Kasich, called the bill an “abomination,” introducing a short-lived amendment to the bill that would reduce the federal gasoline tax to 4 cents per gallon.
TRUST FUND HISTORY – The Reason Public Policy Institute Policy Study 216[21] by Bob Poole in 1996 reviewed the history of the Federal Highway User Trust Fund, seeking to account for all costs in order to reveal a more accurate listing of donor versus recipient states aggregated over the life of the Fund. Conventional wisdom is that 21 states are donor states.
RPPI reasonably underestimated the costs of Federal administration, mandates, delays and distortion of priorities. This exercise revealed that the number of donor states is 33, 12 more than are generally considered donor states. Because RPPI conservatively estimated and because other costs exist that were not included in the analysis such as the significant resources state and local governments use lobbying to recover “free money,” 33 donor states is an understatement. In a yet-to-be-released CATO study, author Gabriel Roth, estimates that at least 42 states are donor states. Thus, few states receive more money than they pay into the Trust Fund and the vast majority of states are injured by the continued movement of funds through the D.C. money-filter. The value of money is not enhanced when it goes thru D.C. A listing of the donor and recipient states based on RPPI’s 1996 research, along with their current representation in Congress is provided in Appendix B.
CONCLUSION – Notwithstanding, the Constitutional foundation, the historical evolution and the political promises, the trend toward higher levels of Federal waste, inefficiency and corruption should disturb all who care about good government. This is exactly what the Polk veto of 1860 predicted, “The corrupting and seducing money influence exerted by the general government in carrying into effect a system of internal improvements might be perverted to increase and consolidate its own power to the detriment of the rights of the States.”
- The Federal gasoline tax was created as a temporary tax to construct the Interstate Highway System.
- The Federal gasoline tax has achieved it mission.
- The Interstate Highway System was completed in 1982.
- Since 1982 the number of “pork” projects has grown exponentially.
- Continuation of the Federal gasoline tax is injuring transportation in at least 33 states.
- The states injured by continuation of the Federal gasoline tax represent 88% of the U.S. House membership.
- The Founders and several successor presidents stated that the U.S. Constitution does not delegate to the Federal government the authority to be involved in transportation improvements.
- The Constitution has not been amended to allow Federal involvement in transportation.
- All of the indirect claims of authority by Congress have been answered by the various presidential vetoes of proposed transportation legislation.
- The warnings that ignoring the limits imposed by the Constitution would open the door to unbounded authority and centralization by Congress have come true.
- The warning that money would become “corrupting and seducing” has come true.
- The warning that ignoring the limits imposed by the Constitution would subjugate the states to Congress has come true.
State Departments of Transportation are sufficiently prepared to handle the added responsibility of prioritizing and managing their own transportation systems. Devolving to the states responsibility for transportation is not only the right thing to do, but will result in improved fiscal efficiency and accountability. After all, this is how the problem of the Cumberland Road was reconciled in 1835. The era of massive transportation construction has ended. The future challenge is to operate and maintain the world’s foremost transportation system with efficiency. This cannot be achieved well with continuing top-down mandates. Rather, devolution and liberalization of Federal restrictions will free those with the most innovative and creative leadership solutions to act. There is a time to lead and a time to follow. Less Federal involvement in transportation will facilitate more leadership in some, if not all 50, states, which will help America to be more competitive in this time of global competition for markets and jobs. We owe it to the future to devolve transportation responsibilities to the states where they rightfully belong.
APPENDIX – A
LINKS TO CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
REGARDING ENUMERATED POWER
APPENDIX – B
| FEDERAL HIGHWAY TRUST FUND | |||
| CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION | |||
| OF | |||
| DONOR AND RECIPIENT STATES[22] | |||
| STATE | DONOR OR RECIPIENT | Congressional Votes | |
| Senate | House | ||
| Alabama | Donor | 2 | 7 |
| Alaska | Recipient | 2 | 1 |
| Arizona | Donor | 2 | 8 |
| Arkansas | Donor | 2 | 4 |
| California | Donor | 2 | 53 |
| Colorado | Donor | 2 | 7 |
| Connecticut | Recipient | 2 | 5 |
| Delaware | Recipient | 2 | 1 |
| Florida | Donor | 2 | 25 |
| Georgia | Donor | 2 | 13 |
| Hawaii | Recipient | 2 | 2 |
| Idaho | Recipient | 2 | 2 |
| Illinois | Donor | 2 | 19 |
| Indiana | Donor | 2 | 9 |
| Iowa | Donor | 2 | 5 |
| Kansas | Donor | 2 | 4 |
| Kentucky | Donor | 2 | 6 |
| Louisiana | Donor | 2 | 7 |
| Maine | Donor | 2 | 2 |
| Maryland | Recipient | 2 | 8 |
| Massachusetts | Recipient | 2 | 10 |
| Michigan | Donor | 2 | 15 |
| Minnesota | Donor | 2 | 8 |
| Mississippi | Donor | 2 | 4 |
| Missouri | Donor | 2 | 9 |
| Montana | Recipient | 2 | 1 |
| Nebraska | Donor | 2 | 3 |
| Nevada | Recipient | 2 | 3 |
| New Hampshire | Donor | 2 | 2 |
| New Jersey | Donor | 2 | 13 |
| New Mexico | Donor | 2 | 3 |
| New York | Donor | 2 | 29 |
| North Carolina | Donor | 2 | 13 |
| North Dakota | Recipient | 2 | 1 |
| Ohio | Donor | 2 | 18 |
| Oklahoma | Donor | 2 | 5 |
| Oregon | Donor | 2 | 5 |
| Pennsylvania | Donor | 2 | 19 |
| Rhode Island | Recipient | 2 | 2 |
| South Carolina | Donor | 2 | 6 |
| South Dakota | Recipient | 2 | 1 |
| Tennessee | Donor | 2 | 9 |
| Texas | Donor | 2 | 32 |
| Utah | Recipient | 2 | 3 |
| Vermont | Recipient | 2 | 1 |
| Virginia | Donor | 2 | 11 |
| Washington | Recipient | 2 | 9 |
| West Virginia | Recipient | 2 | 3 |
| Wisconsin | Donor | 2 | 8 |
| Wyoming | Recipient | 2 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 100 | 435 | |
| 17 Recipient States | 34 | 54 | |
| 33 Donor States | 66 | 381 | |
[1] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.[2] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.[3] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.[4] See Appendix A for a link.[5] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.[6] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.[7] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.[8] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.[9] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.[10] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.[11] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.
[12] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.
[13] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.
[14] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.
[15] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.
[16] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.
[17] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.
[18] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.
[19] See Appendix A for a link to the Congressional Record.
[20] See Appendix A for a link.
[21] http://www.reason.org/ps216.html
[22] http://www.reason.org/ps216.html